Legal positivism is a family of theories about the nature of law. If I were to characterize the common element in these theories, the element that makes them all legal positivist, it would be that all regard law as at least in part a human artefact. Indeed, it is because law is at least in part a human artefact that provides support for the positivists' claim that a norm can be law even if it is morally infelicitous. For because human beings are fallible "crooked timber," the norms they construct, even if with the best intentions, will deviate from what morality would dictate. Now there are many versions of legal positivism on offer. There is John Austin's version: law consists of the commands of the sovereign, he, she, or they who are habitually obeyed.
1 There is Hans Kelsen's version: law is the set of norms instructing officials when to apply sanctions, norms that are rendered valid by an assumed "grundnorm." 2 There is H.L.A.
Hart's version: law is the set of norms generally obeyed and rendered valid by the rule of recognition, a master norm accepted by officials as obligatory. 3 There is Joseph Raz's version:
law is the set of norms that are generally obeyed and that are the product of authorities, those whose determination of our obligations purport to be preemptive of the reasons on which they LAW (1961) .
are based. 4 And there is Scott Shapiro's version: law is the set of norms that represent the plans of those who have the authority to plan for us and settle what we are obligated to do. 5 And these are not the only versions of legal positivism in the literature.
Moreover, these versions of legal positivism fall into two warring camps. Some versions-Raz's and Shapiro's, for example-are in the camp of exclusive legal positivism.
Those in that camp believe that law consists entirely of social facts-what some human beings did-and in no part of moral considerations. To the extent that a legal norm purports to incorporate moral considerations, the latter are not part of the law. They are like references in the law to foreign law, or to mathematics, or to some other set of norms. The norms referenced are not constitutive of the law but are external to it.
The other warring camp, the inclusive legal positivists, is probably the more numerous one among legal philosophers today. The inclusive legal positivists believe that moral norms can be at least among the determinants of the law and thus that social facts need not be the only determinants of law.
4 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979) . 5 SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) .
Finally, there are those like me who believe the division between exclusive and inclusive legal positivism to be merely terminological and without theoretical significance. 6 What is significant is that all legal positivists regard law as necessarily a human artefact, at least in part.
Legal norms are posited by human beings, those with the authority to do so. And therein lies the connection between legal positivism as an account of the nature of law and originalism as an account of the interpretation of legal norms. And it is to originalism that I now turn.
II. Originalism and Legal Positivism: The Basic Connection
If law is a human artefact, and if legal norms are posited by those persons with the authority to do so, as legal positivism would have it, then it follows that the job of those who must interpret the texts promulgated by the authorities-texts meant to convey the norms the authorities have chosen-is to discover just what norms those texts convey. And it follows that the interpreters' job is to seek the authorially-intended meanings of the legal texts. Thus far, then, the problems of recondite meaning and aggregation attributed to authorially-intended meaning originalism are not avoided by but are inherited by original public meaning originalism. But there is one final problem with original public meaning originalism, a problem that does not plague authorially-intended meaning originalism. That is the problem of mindless law-making. According to original public meaning originalism, the law that authorities intend to make may not be the law they end up making. That is because, if original public meaning originalism is to distinguish itself from authorially-intended meaning originalism, the laws that the original public meaning folks will claim to have been promulgated can theoretically differ from the laws the authorities intended to promulgate. Laws will be human creations, but they will not be laws any humans intended to create. They will be mindless creations. And any theory of legal interpretation that contemplates mindless, accidental law creation is a theory that has a serious burden to overcome. If such a theory is to succeed, it must show that the number of mistakes it produces-mistakes defined as the divergence between the laws actually intended and the laws the interpretive theory produces-are fewer than the mistakes produced by directly seeking the authorially-intended laws. That original public meaning theories can meet this burden cannot be ruled out a priori. Nonetheless, I remain doubtful that original public meaning theories can succeed. Thus, from here on the version of originalism that I claim to be a corollary of legal positivism is the authorially-intended meaning version. Dworkin at times also claims that some legal norms contain words that refer to moral concepts, words such as "cruelty," "equality," and "freedom of speech." 13 I claim, however, that unless morality itself contains joints that correspond to such words in legal norms, so that it is possible that such words have moral referents, then, contra Dworkin, those words must refer to their authors' particular conceptions, the authors' criteria for the words' applications. 14 And note that one consequence of deeming such words to refer to principles in the moral ontological cupboard, aside from the worry whether morality has distinct principles that correspond with the words that are meant to refer to those principles, is that the final authority within the legal example, has denied that it should interpret the words of the Charter based on what those who adopted it may have meant by those words. 16 To repeat an earlier point, however, words are only words, and words in a particular language or idiolect, rather than mere marks or sounds, if they were produced by an author or authors intending to communicate something thereby to an audience. By disregarding authorially-intended meaning, the Canadian courts are essentially appropriating the marks on the page to author their preferred meanings-much as a kidnapper, who cuts out words and phrases from a magazine to fashion a ransom note, appropriates others' marks in order to convey his own meanings. And the Canadian courts are undoubtedly concerned that their meanings in their opinions be followed by those over whom they have authority rather than treated as the Canadian courts treat the words of the Charter's authors.
My conclusion then is that legal norms are either rules or standards. Standards are not norms that are interpreted. and rule-following, whether they are the rules of mathematics or the rules we create through our intentions. We can be certain that we know how to add numbers we have never before added.
And likewise, we can be certain about whether we did or did not intend to ban particular dogs in restaurants even if we did not know of or contemplate those particular dogs at the time we authored the ban. There will be occasions when we are not certain-more on that possibility in the next section-but in general we will not be plagued by Kripkenstein doubts. In short, there is no reason to doubt the existence of intended meanings that are beyond the particular contents of the mind of the author of those meanings at the time of authorship.
The Infelicitous Result Problem
Suppose the authorially-intended meaning of a legal rule leads to what interpreter believes are infelicitous results. Indeed, suppose the interpreter believes that the authority or authorities who promulgated the legal rule would themselves regard its results as infelicitous.
Should that lead the interpreter to believe that the intended meaning of the rule is other than it appears to be? In general, the answer is "no."
The relation between the authorially-intended meaning and infelicitous results can take four forms. First, the authors might say, we agree our rule leads to these infelicitous results, and we regret intending the meaning that leads to those results. We simply made a mistake and authored a bad legal norm. This problem is the banal problem of bad law, a problem legal positivism surely contemplates and in a sense embraces.
Second, the authors might say, yes, these results are infelicitous, but we knew our rule, like all rules, would be over and under-inclusive and that therefore would lead to infelicitous results in some cases. But we still believe that having a rule rather than a standard is on balance preferable despite occasional infelicitous results, such as those here. This problem is the problem of rules, a problem that is well known. 19 But it is not a problem that undermines the proposition that rules can be on balance beneficial, much less undermines the possibility of their existence.
Third, the authors might say, these results are so terrible that it is absurd to assume that our intended meaning produces them. 20 If we had said "no vehicles in the park," would anyone really assume we meant to exclude emergency vehicles, such as ambulances, even if we made no specific exception for them? Or if we had said "no cell phone use in the library," would anyone really assume we meant the ban to cover reports of a violent crime or a fire, even if we made no specific exceptions for such uses? Our intended meanings often extend beyond and sometimes One answer, the one Richard Kay and I favor, is to look for a shared intended meaning, a meaning intended by at least the number of legislators required to enact the law. 23 In many instances, a shared intended meaning will exist. When my wife and I created a trust document to deal with our assets and their distribution, the meanings we each intended to be expressed by that document were, I believe, the same meanings. They were shared intended meanings. So, too, I
believe, are the intended meanings expressed in the academic rules enacted by my faculty. And if just married couples and law faculties can have shared intended meanings, so too can legislatures, panels of judges, and other multi-member legal authorities.
On the other hand, if there is no intended-meaning shared by the number of legislators required to enact legal norms, then the texts they promulgate are, for purposes of expressing valid legal norms, meaningless. They are gibberish. 24 No norm was enacted and expressed through them. Now some originalists wish to avoid this conclusion at all costs. That explains the attraction of the original public meaning version, as I said when I discussed that version in section III. There, I expressed my doubts that original public meaning originalism, which relies on a construct, the reasonable member of the public at the time of the enactment, who in turn is seeking the original authorially-intended meaning, could improve upon authorially-intended meaning originalism. Some proponents of original public meaning originalism believe that it can avoid the aggregation problem of authorially-intended meaning originalism. As I said in section III., I do not believe that it can. So let me give an example of a failure of shared meaning that cannot be avoided by original public meaning. arbitrary. And furthermore, as I said in section III., proceeding that way produces a law-in this case, a ban on A-that was not intended by the body with the authority to make law. It was produced by only one member of a three member legislature that is authorized to make law only by a majority vote. And although a majority voted in favor of banning X, a majority did not vote in favor of banning A. The latter ban was produce by an arbitrary stipulation. It is an example mindless law creation. Now some critics of the authorially-intended meaning version of originalism and proponents of the original public meaning version are not put off by this degree of mindlessness.
They believe that some background rules of interpretation can produce law in cases in which the authorially-intended meaning approach produces gibberish. 25 Such rules might be instruction such as "when a word has multiple meanings, choose the first meaning of it listed in such-andsuch dictionary." If these rules can handle all the cases of failed aggregation of authoriallyintended meaning, then even though the laws they produce will be partially the result of a mindless process, such laws may still be preferable to having legislators fail to enact laws and instead enact gibberish. For if the legislators know that these rules will operate on their texts, presumably they will take care to see that the rules produce the meanings that they intend. There will be more cases of mindful law than would be enacted without those rules, when the alternative to mindful law is gibberish. Such background rules can, it is argued, bring a good deal of convergence of authorially-intended meanings and meanings the background rules produce. They cannot eliminate the gap between the mindful and the mindless, but they can narrow it.
Ultimately, whether reliance on background rules will produce enough convergence between mindful law creation and mindless law creation is, like all rule-consequentialist prescriptions, an empirical matter, as is whether the mindless laws that remain are better than or worse than sticking solely with the search for authorially-intended meanings and the possibility of finding gibberish. It also depends on there being a determinate set of background rules, moreover background rules of which legislators are aware and understand. I cannot say these things are impossible, although I admit to being skeptical.
VI. Conclusion
In concluding, I can be brief. Legal positivism views law as a human creation. It is created by those who have the authority to create it. Originalism has it that texts are only texts and not marks, sounds, smoke, flags, or some other mute item when those marks, sounds, or other items are used by an author or authors to convey the authors' intended meaning to an audience. When the authors are those with the authority to create laws, and the authors are intending by their texts to create laws and communicate their content to the relevant audience, then it seems natural to assume that the laws mean what their authors intended them to mean.
Legal positivism and originalism go together and cannot be pried apart.
